turning a blind eye

Volume 2 No 2 - 1998

TURNING A BLIND EYE

W. A. Tupman

University of Exeter

(Paper presented to the conference on 'Miscarriages of Justice in the UK and Italy', University of Palermo, July 1998)

This paper compares the cases of Italy and Northern Ireland with reference to the origins of terrorism in these two countries. It is part of a larger study, the outline of which is available in my paper "Beyond Terrorism".1 The two case studies represent examples of a category I call the "Double Minority" - a category derived from the work of Robert Moss in his book "Urban Guerilla".2 In this category there are two opposing terrorist or urban guerrilla groups within a single society both of which are using paramilitary tactics against each other as well as the security forces.

The paper focuses on the role of the state and of particular arms of the state in the creation of paramilitary groups out of their response to campaigns of peaceful protest. Italy and Northern Ireland are particularly comparable because, as the title suggests, the police and security forces in both countries initially turned a blind eye to the paramilitary and other violent operations of, on the one hand the Protestants, and on the other the Neo- Fascists. The phrase used here is security forces because in both countries the role of policing is performed by a number of competing groups. In Italy the SID, the local police and the Carabineri.3 In Northern Ireland, the Special Branch, the Ulster Constabulary, the former B Specials and now the Ulster Defence Regiment.4 There are competing police forces and this also contributes in some degree to the development of a problem.

It is important to use a comparative approach, particularly when dealing with Northern Ireland. Little work has been done comparing the Northern Ireland problem to phenomena in other countries. There is a danger that if this work is not done Northern Ireland will be seen as a sui generis phenomenon originating in the psychology of Irish people. This is a mistaken view as work in this paper will show. The paper argues that the failure of the security forces to recognise and respond to a problem led to a security problem for other sectors of society: in Northern Ireland particularly Catholics in Belfast, in Italy immigrants in the northern cities and students in universities. This produced a situation in which the new paramilitary groups such as the Red Brigades and the Provisional IRA could present themselves as defence forces and retaliatory forces representing these groups. Sometimes they could even represent themselves as administrators of justice and even a police force in their own right for certain minorities within the community.

Crimes committed by the state can be crimes of omission as well as crimes of commission. The early days of the terrorist movements of the late 1960's show this extremely clearly. In both Italy and Ireland the security forces omitted to take action against the right wing terrorist and paramilitary groups while they overreacted against demonstrations by the left wing.5 Study of these periods and study of the need for an even-handed response by the State is necessary in order to deduce ways of correct action for the State when threatened by paramilitary violence at the extremes of the community.

Before examining these campaigns there are a few definition problems that need to be looked into. Some of the phenomena that will be examined in this paper fall on the borderline of state terror and state terrorism, right wing terror and various others not frequently examined.

The question of the legitimate use of violence by the state or by arms of the state is brought into question by the events to be examined. If it could be demonstrated that extreme right wing organisations had penetrated the security forces in both Northern Ireland and in Italy and that on occasion these individuals wearing uniform perpetrated action that would be considered terrorist if perpetrated by ordinary citizens, does this make their actions part of something that could be called `state terrorism'? This author would define state terror as a systematic campaign by the state against the whole of the population to produce a climate of fear in which officers of the state can follow the policies they wish without organised opposition taking place against them. Violence and arbitrary arrest are used to perpetrate state terror. Typical examples would be events in Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia. In other words, state terror can be associated with the atomisation of society and the creation of a totalitarian system.

State terrorism is something quite different. This would be the use of `terrorist style' tactics by an arm of the State, usually the army or the police, against a particular section of the population, usually an ethnic minority or a group of intellectuals, often students, in order to deter them from some form of political activity. The notion of state terrorism implies that there would be powerful supporters within the government or the higher reaches of the State that encourage and keep the miscreants from being arrested and locked up for their crimes. Terrorist tactics may be defined here as involving the use of assassination in a systematic way, the occasional use of bombings, the creation of disappearances, the use of torture and various other phenomena that would not normally be seen as legitimate if used by the State.6 Problems arise in this area when one considers a single incident such as the recent shooting of IRA members in Gibraltar.7 If Mrs Thatcher authorised it, was it an act of terror by the State or was it the legitimate use of force against people who were a terrorist threat to the State? If Mrs. Thatcher did not authorise it but it was authorised by, say, the Secretary of State, Tom King, does that make a difference? If it were authorised simply by the commanding officer of the SAS, would it be in any way possible to call it terror or terrorism? Whatever was said at the inquest, a cynical observer could read in to the incident the intention to warn the IRA that future attempts to commit such atrocities would be met by the shooting of their activists especially since it followed a similar ambush of activists on operation in Northern Ireland. Does a State fighting terrorism have a right to execute without due process?8

In many ways it raises the same sorts of questions as events in Northern Ireland and Italy in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Is it legitimate to use of "whiff of Grape-shot" approach when faced with a challenge to particular policies the State is following? It could be argued that it is rational, since one of the ways that the State can test whether a campaign of protest is serious is by hitting it hard and seeing if it stands up again. If it doesn't, the State doesn't have to worry about it. If it does, the State may have to produce some kind of political response.

There is a second question worth addressing here. Is the State responsible for criminal activity by employees of the State particularly from the branch which exercises the monopoly of force that the State wields? It is possible to approach this problem in terms of absolute values or it is possible to approach it in realpolitik. In terms of realpolitik if the use of violence prevents further violence, it is good. If, however, it makes violence worse, it is bad. If it makes things worse it is also therefore a crime. In terms of absolute values, there are a number of possible ways of measuring goodness and badness, particularly ones using international agreements on human rights. These agreements all provide grounds for the suspension of human rights in emergencies. Justifications of such suspensions usually base themselves on realpolitik.

With most of these questions in mind, it is time to address the real world phenomena central to this paper.

All states, particularly industrial ones, have areas which can be considered in some way `marginal'. There are ethnic minorities who quite often live territorially at the margins of the State and there are those that live at the margins of the prosperity that characterises urban life in the modern industrial setting. Depending one one's point of view, one can see the violence of the late 1960's arising from the margins of society. Either they were the creation of the ideological margins, in other words the extreme left and the extreme right, however defined, who took the opportunity to exploit grievances that they perceived as needing redress within the society. Or they can be seen as partially spontaneous outbursts of despair of groups within the community who had been left behind in the economic boom of the 1960s.

The alliance of the margins - the ideological, the ethnic/territorial and the desperate produced problems that the State was ill-equipped to deal with. By the very nature of the security forces their response to the problems was bound to be problematic and counterproductive. The security forces see themselves as there to enforce either the doctrine of keeping the peace or the doctrine of enforcing the status quo. The effect can be the same. They will tend to try to put down manifestations of despair because they will see them as problems of public order. In a democratic society this will be defended, arguing that it is possible to gain redress for one's grievances through the existing system. One of the problems however of a democratic society is that the tyranny of the majority can produce permanent minorities who can never become part of the coalition building that creates political parties who compete for the spoils of office. Groups that are left out of this coalition building process will never benefit. There will be nobody to bargain on their behalf and deliver them the `goodies'. Northern Ireland Catholics and immigrants from the south of Italy to the north are groups of this sort, especially where housing is concerned.9

It is dangerous to over stress comparisons between Ireland and Italy. One could start by saying that they both begin with the letter `I', but that would be a rather banal and useless point to make. It is clear that there are a number of points however that events in Northern Ireland and Italy have in common. The objective of this paper will be to examine them and see how far the actions taken by the security forces can be held responsible for creating the terrorist campaigns that these original campaigns to redress particular grievances grew into.

In both cases the problem began as a result of agitation over housing, civil rights and other social services by leftist groups seeking to recruit members by articulating genuine grievances on the part of specific sectors of the population. On the one hand the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association began to fight for civil rights for Catholics.10 On the other hand the far left in Italy began to fight for better housing for the squatter populations that had come up to Northern Italy from the south.11 In both cases traditional radicalism was being challenged. The Irish Republican Army which had monopolised revolutionary radicalism in Northern Ireland for the previous forty years was suddenly challenged by people trying to start a peaceful campaign for political change. Suddenly the use of the gun and the bomb to obtain a 32-county Ireland was being challenged. The agitation also challenged the notion that what Catholics most needed was a 32-county Ireland. The agitation began to confront the day-to-day problems of Catholics living within the Ulster state.12

In the same way the far left challenged the traditional radicalism of the Communist Party.13 It is not wholly fair to say that the Communist Party ignored the problems of the squatter and immigrant populations. It is, however, fair to say that after 1948 the Communist Party, as all European Communist parties, found itself in a blind alley, waiting for an inevitable revolution which would occur at some unpredictable date in the future. In order to find a way out, it began to explore the possibilities of a parliamentary road to socialism. This opened the possibility for the far left to walk into an area that the Communists were beginning to leave vacant. The notion of the historic compromise and the possibility of Christian Democrats and Communists working together opened up areas for the far left other than those involving the simple problems of everyday life for immigrants in the northern cities. The far left were thus also able to target the radical young who were beginning to see the Communist Party as old-fashioned and out of date. A parallel here can be drawn with the emergence of the People's Democracy in Belfast. This was a Trotskyite group based on students who were also looking for non-traditional ways of confronting both the problems of Catholics in Northern Ireland and the problems of political change at a macro level in Northern Ireland.14 There are also strong differences. Potere Operario, in its search for a working-class cause, was rapidly supplanted by Lotta Continua and its obsession with problems in the universities.15

The Far Left followed tactics of marching, like the NICRA in Northern Ireland, basing their tactics on Martin Luther King. Unlike NICRA, however, the Italian Far Left were prepared to fight. They were prepared to fight the ideas of the Italian Communist Party. They were also happy to fight the police.16 NICRA were not looking for a physical confrontation although they were expecting to be assaulted.17

In terms of perception by the rest of the political system, however, one rung up the ladder, a programme of peaceful marches began to gain publicity for the plight of particular groups in society. What then happened was that what might be called the Right Wing but really the representatives of a rival community began to respond to this agitation by violence. In Northern Ireland this had been the traditional response of the Protestants to Catholic agitation. The goal was always to remind them they were in a minority and were only there on sufferance on the part of the majority Protestant community. When it came to questions of power there were always more Protestants and they were better armed. So the Protestant goal was to deter the desperate from articulating their grievances and also to deter, what we might call the leftists, from providing them with political leadership.18

The Neo-Fascists provided a similar response to the marching in the Italian cities. This too was a harking back to the past - to the 1920's when fascists and communists had fought for control of the Italian streets.19 But in both bases the response of the "Right Wing" was mixed. There was a traditionalist establishment response and a radical street violence type of response. In Northern Ireland it can be symbolised by the differences between the Orange Order, the UDA and the UVF. In Italy it can symbolised by the Police response and the Neo-Fascist response. Also in the equation has to be placed the Christian Democratic Party.20

Overall, however, what is significant is that the police initially turn a blind eye to the violence of the right wing. In Northern Ireland this is shown very strongly at Burntollett Bridge. It is shown even more strongly in the police riot of West Belfast.21 In Italy the Police stood by while right-wingers attacked demonstrators.22 Both earlier and later they attacked the demonstrations themselves. The Italian far left, according to newspaper reports, tended to confront the police in a way that the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association never needed to. The Italian far left were happy to look for a confrontation with the police because they saw themselves as revolutionary.23 On the other hand the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association did not see themselves as looking for a confrontation although that is what they got and it was the showing of these confrontations on television that made change in Northern Ireland inevitable.

In both cases the right-wingers recognise that their tactics are being counter productive. They seem to have enhanced the legitimacy of the demonstrators by their own violence. Their response was a curious one. In both cases they attempted to discredit the movements of the Left by planting bombs and leaving evidence to suggest this was the work of left-wingers. The attack on the Belfast water supply being a classic of this kind where Irish tricolours and IRA leaflets were left to suggest that the bombing had been the work of the IRA.24 Similar events surround the arrest and interrogation of the anarchist Valpreda in Italy.25

Again the security forces were at first quite happy to go along with this and use these bombings as an excuse to attack the leftist communities and invade their homes.26 There was no attempt to look for evidence. The excuse was seized to further intimidate the communities who were seen as causing the problem. In Italy the SID was much happier than the RUC in Northern Ireland. Its leadership was later to be arrested, and accused of running a campaign to destabilise the state.27 In these circumstances it was no great surprise that very shortly real bombers came along. Out of this grew the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland and in Italy the Red Brigade, the Armed Proletarian Nuclei etc. Tim Pat Coogan suggests that attempts were made to arm the Provisional IRA by elements within the Southern Irish Government.28 The arming of the Red Brigade and the other Italian groups is a longer story and one that needs to be studied.

There was then the fundamental difference between Italy and Northern Ireland. In the Northern Ireland situation what was interesting was the loss of initiative by the IRA and the later regaining of the initiative after the failure of the peaceful Civil Rights Campaign. In Italy, what is interesting is the sudden appearance of the Maoists and their rather short life. The people who took over in Italy who were often called the Second Generation were quite different from the Lotta Continua activists and their predecessors on the left wing of the Communist Party.29 It may be that we are deceived by the continuation of name in the case of the IRA into thinking that the same people emerged as leaders after the failure of NICRA. Internment in fact produced a totally new organisation which went by the name of the Provisional IRA. In many ways this is not the same organisation as existed back in the 1956/62 border campaign.30 It is however tied to the organisation by a blood relationship, in that the tactics appear to be the same and the people doing it are often sons, grand-children and nephews of the people arrested ten years earlier.

What is also fascinating, is the way in which organisations on both left and right in Northern Ireland and Italy appear to mirror each other in their splits and their hostility to one another. But leaving all this to one side, what is the role of the security forces in creating this problem? Firstly in both cases the security forces have a major weight of responsibility to bear in that they allow the urban guerrilla/terrorist groups to represent themselves as protectors of the community. Because the RUC chose to attack the Catholics and the Italian police chose to attack the immigrant communities, these communities felt that they were not safe. They looked for their own vigilante groups and found them in the terrorist/urban guerrilla organisations.31 The Police abdicated their political independence. They turned a blind eye to attacks by one community on the other. They therefore legitimised these groups and permitted them to recruit and grow.32 In many ways it was this abdication of responsibility which made it possible for the terrorist groups to develop and continue their hold over the community. On the one hand the Irish Catholics, on the other hand the Italian immigrants and students.

Secondly, the Police bear a great burden of responsibility for not going after the right wing groups and arresting their members when they clearly break the law.33 It is no excuse for the Police to say that the right wingers were well intentioned and were helping them stop this left wing threat to the security of society. The effect is as suggested in the previous paragraph. The Police failure legitimised these groups.

The Police will always accuse the terrorists of having driven them out of the community but in fact they left the community unpoliced during these periods. There is a lesson here for all police forces: if you do not police a community it will develop its own forms of policing and its own forms of protection. The Police are not there to defend the government of the day, they are there to ensure the protection of the citizen from attack. If they fail to do this the citizens will develop their own means of defence. But there is a third way in which the Police turned a blind eye in both countries. Many policemen turned a blind eye to the activities of their colleagues. Beatings and assaults were ignored, and sometimes, it was suspected the actual so-called right wing terrorists, the murder gangs of Northern Ireland, the bombers of Italy were security personnel in or out of uniform.34 This was widely asserted but nothing was done to curb the activities of these people. Such curious morality which put loyalty to colleagues above loyalty to the law has to be questioned. Such a morality in fact led to the deaths and injuries of many more policemen than would have happened had these people been stopped at an early date. In the end in Italy a high official in the Intelligence Service and several members of the security forces were arrested.35 Carabinieri are still being arrested.36 The State failed to control those within its own ranks to whom responsibility for the monopoly of force fell.

In Northern Ireland more serious efforts were made to bring the RUC and its paramilitary wing the B Specials under control. The abolition of the B Specials was a sensible step, although its replacement by the Ulster Defence Regiment rather negated the first step.37 The introduction of officers from the mainland to turn the RUC into a more normal force was also a success, although again it could be said to have been negated at the point that an officer within the RUC once again became Chief Constable.38 It is said to find the same accusations being levelled at the RUC as were 20 years previously, but not surprising, when the same internal morality of protecting one's colleagues ahead of enforcing the law is in practice.

But there is a fourth way in which a blind eye was turned. In the prisons themselves the attempts of right wingers to persecute imprisoned left wingers was allowed to continue. In Italy this led finally to a connection between the Red Brigade and the Camorra. Both organisations had problems inside the prison system with the Mafia and it is no surprise that they created an alliance.39 More surprisingly is that left and right also came to be allies inside the prison system. In the UK we have seen long-term Irish prisoners aligned with the life-sentenced, especially those outside the protection of the main criminal gangs.40 These things should not be surprising. If prison officers refuse to protect prison inmates, then those inmates have to create their own systems of self protection.

And now today in the UK we see a fifth way of turning a blind eye. There have been several ambushes and `finishing off' of IRA men in recent months. It started with the alleged `shoot to kill' policy of the RUC which now might appear to a partisan observer to have been taken over by the SAS.41 These matters could have been made legal by a declaration of martial law but the state has chosen not to. Instead it appears to have chosen to try and follow a policy of terrorism to intimidate the remnants of the IRA into surrender. This is reminiscent of Hoover's activities against the Black Panthers of the United States during the 1960's. It needs to be said that Hoover's activities were extremely successful. The Black Panthers no longer exist as an organisation. Perhaps it is an appropriate time for such tactics to be followed. What is certain is that it is dangerous for the state to turn a blind eye to activities which are clearly illegal under existing law. If it wishes to make them legitimate it should pass new laws. Otherwise its legitimacy will be questioned not only by possible new recruits for the IRA but by supporters in Europe and the United States. The danger is that these new tactics if not legitimised will produce a Shiite style response of martyrs prepared to commit suicide to take soldiers and policemen with them. General Kitson in his book `Bunch of Five' makes quite clear that it is legitimate to change the law but it is not legitimate to work outside the law.42 Turning a blind eye to breaches of the law will only make it easier to breach the law on another occasion and will thus bring the whole framework of democracy into question. In Italy the authorities have managed to defeat the Red Brigades by regaining the moral high ground that they lost at the beginning of the campaign. The British Government is now in danger of abandoning the moral high ground and legitimising the terrorist.

To what extent can police activity or inactivity be held responsible for creating splits in these terrorists movements? In one sense the police contribute to the possibility of splits on the right by their very inactivity. Splits on the right can be seen as a consequence of growth. But there is also a sense in which the splits represent an urban/rural divide and a traditional modern divide. The same could be said of the "left" here too, a traditionalist group is supplanted by another group. But there are really other reasons for these splits too. The traditionalist group see themselves as having primarily a defensive posture.

The newer groups wish to take the fight to the security forces. The traditionalist groups are often happy with the acts of symbolic violence. The newer groups want to kill people and gain revenge. There are splits over ideology, splits over leaders, and splits over the pace of activity. The British security forces have long been accused of exacerbating the splits in the Republican Movement in Northern Ireland in order to weaken those organisations.43 Certainly there is no evidence of their involvement in the later emergence of the Irish National Liberation Army.

The fact that splits develop, however, creates more possibilities for conflicts. From a simple confrontation between left and right, the situation develops into a triangular relationship between left, right, and police with one side of the triangle a rather weak adversary relationship than between the Police and the right. But as the organisations begin to split there we move into a much more polygonal relationship and a number of further possibilities are raised including that of combination. The more interesting are the attempts by groups on the left and right to make common cause. In Northern Ireland initially there were attempts by the official IRA and the UVF to make common cause against the Provisional IRA in the name of creating some sort of non-sectarian working class movement.44 In the Italian case there is suspicion that left and right trained together in the Lebanon and began to make common cause there. There is evidence of interchange of weaponry.45

The full story of this, however, is difficult to unravel.

The point is, that as the number of possible conflicts and relationships increases the scale of the problem increases too. There is a tendency by security forces to see "splitting" as helping their position. A step back from the problem would demonstrate that in fact the problem gets worse. It may appear that "The Terrorists" spend a lot of time killing each other, but the long term result is greater insecurity on the part of the population.

How might the police have acted differently from the start and would this have prevented the development of terrorism? Firstly, and most obviously, the police should have been more even-handed with the initial public order problem. Either they should have broken the heads of both sets of demonstrators or they should have let both sets of demonstrators demonstrate if necessary against each other. Secondly, the police should have acted in a way that made clear that the right wingers and Protestants were behaving illegitimately when they used violence. It is not the political cause that is legitimate or illegitimate, it is the means being used that are illegitimate. The police should have been able to distinguish between these points. Thirdly, the police should have behaved in a more disciplined way.

Questions must be raised about the nature of middle and senior management and their ability to remind them of their duty. Fourthly, the police should never have allowed themselves to get into a situation where sizeable sectors of the population felt that it no longer depended upon the police for its security.

Whether all this would have prevented the development of terrorism may be arguable. Small groups may have appeared anyway, but if they could have been kept from gaining a source of recruits and from presenting themselves as following the legitimate path because they have no other choice, then whatever problem arose it would have been very short-lived and could have been dealt with in the same way as any organised crime problem can be dealt with. The point must also be made that the patterns of events diverge.

FOOTNOTES

1. Tupman, W. A., "Beyond Terrorism - towards a theory of scenarios of political violence", Brookfield Paper No. 1, University of Exeter, Exeter 1988.

2. Moss, R., "Urban Guerrilla", Temple Smith, London, 1972. p.55. Moss calls it "the mirror effect".

3. Interpol, "European Police and Judicial Systems", Interpol, Paris, 1988, pp. 61-3.

4. See Stalker J., "Stalker", Harrap, London, 1988, p.33 for the complex position of the Special Branch in Northern Ireland. See also Appendices IV and V of Government of Northern Ireland, Report of Commission chaired by Lord Cameron (cmd 552), Disturbances in Northern Ireland, Belfast, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as "Cameron Commission"), pp. 109-110.

5. Omitting to take action against right wing and over-reacting against left wing demonstrations. For Northern Ireland: Cameron Commission, ibid., pp. 71-76. For Italy: The Economist, vol. 227, May 18, 1968, p.30.

6. The author is unhappy about getting involved in controversies over the definition of terrorism. He has discussed the definition problems of the concept in Tupman op. cit. passim and in Tupman W. A., Brookfield Paper No. 4, University of Exeter, 1989.

7. For a review of the murkier aspects of the Gibraltar shootings, see the booklet "Rock Bottom", A Private Eye Report, Pressdram, London. February

1989, passim.

8. For a justification of the shootings, see Maitland O., "Margaret Thatcher, the First Ten Years", London, 1989, Sidgwick and Jackson, p.130.

9. For Italy,see Amyot, G. "The Italian Communist Party - the Crisis of the Popular Front Strategy, Croom Helm, London, 1981, p. 57 on the migrants and pp. 173-74 on the students.

For Northern Ireland see Utaly, T. E. "Lessons of Ulster", Dent, London, 1975, pp. 26-30.

10. Rose, R. "Governing without Consensus", Faber & Faber, London, 1971, p. 278.

11. The far left in Italy was and still is extremely fragmented. See Earle J., "Report on Italy" Conflict Studies 19, p. 7. For a brief survey of groups existing at that period, Amyot op.cit, pp. 170-193 describes the challenge to the traditional strategy of the Communist Party of Italy. Also The Economist, vol.228, July 20, 1968, pp. 25-8.

12. Coogan, T.P. "The IRA", Pall Mall, London, 1987, pp. 420-423.

13. Amyot, G. op.cit., pp. 173-6.

14. Cameron Commission, op.cit., pp. 32-33 and 80-88. For a history of People's Democracy see Arthur P., "The People's Democracy 1968-73", Blackstaff, Belfast, 1974.

15. Nardi, G. "L'Immaginazione e il Potere - cronache del '68 a Pisa", pp. 29-38, 85-102 and 108-117 covers the history of Potere Operario, the student movement and Lotta Continua.

16. Keesings Archive 20, 1974, p. 26410A.

17. Farrell, M. "The Orange State", Pluto, London, 1980, p.250. Cited in Bishop P. and Makie E., "The Provisional IRA", Corgi, 1988, p.79. See also Cameron Commission, op.cit, pp. 77-79 especially paragraphs 190 and 193.

18. Cameron Commission, op.cit, pp. 9-10, 87-89 and 91-92.

19. Wilkinson P. "The New Fascists", Grant McIntyre, London, 1981, p.22. Keesings Archive 20, 1974, p. 26410A.

20. Wilkinson, P. ibid, p. 67-70.

21. Cameron Commission, op.cit, pp.74-5 (Burntollet). Government of Northern Ireland, report of Tribunal of Enquiry chaired by the Honourable Mr Justice Scarman "Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969", cmnd 566, HMSO Belfast, 1972. pp. 133-75 and pp. 193.5 (West Belfast).

22. Nardi, G. op.cit., pp. 102-105.

23. ibid., p. 102.

24. Scarman Commission, op.cit., pp. 22-24.

25. Weinberg L., "Patterns of neo-Fascist Violence in Italian Politics". Terrorism 2, Part 3-4, p. 246.

Bowyer Bell J., "A Time of Terror", Basic Books, New York, 1978, pp. 241-242.

26. Rose R. "Northern Ireland",. Macillan, London, 1976, p.23.

27. Bowyer Bell, J. op.cit., pp. 247-8 and p. 250.

28. Coogan, T.P., op.cit., pp. 464-7.

29. Jenkins, B.M. "Terrorism and Beyond", Rand, Santa Monica, 1982, pp. 63-5.

30. Bishop P. & Mallie E. op.cit, 151-3 and 192.

31. ibid., pp. 108-113 and 121-122 (Northern Ireland).

The Times (London), 1968, March 1st, 7c, March 2nd, 1e, March 18th, 4c, April 1st, 4h (4th edition).

32. Cameron Commission, op.cit., p. 74 makes the point that the RUC always stood with their backs to the Protestants and facing the Catholics if two groups had to be kept apart.

The Times (London), 1968, June 3rd, 4d, June 4th 1e, June 10th, 4c, June 20th, 1f.

33. Cameron Commission, op.cit, pp. 74-5.

34. Northern Ireland: Coogan T.P., "The IRA", Fontana, London, 1987, pp. 563-567. See also Dillon M. & Lehane E., "Political Murder in Northern Ireland", Sunday Times (London), 16th June 1986, p.9b.

35. Bowyer Bell J., op.cit., pp. 247-8 and 250.

36. Sunday Times (London), 12th December 1985, p. 24e.

37. Callaghan, J., "A House Divided", Collins, London, 1973.

38. ibid., pp.131-2 (unfulfilled plan).

39. Sunday Times (London) May 25, 1986, p.10g. Times (London), February 18, 1983, p. 89.

40. Beresford P.C.F.M., The Official IRA and Republican Clubs in Northern lIreland 1968-74 and their relations with other political and paramilitary groups. Unpublished PhD thesis, Exeter University, 1978, p. 609.

41. Stalker and Private Eye pamphlet, "Rock Bottom".

Stalker J., "Stalker", Harrap, London, 1988 is an account of the curious events surrounding the investigation of the allegations of a `shoot to kill' polixy in Northern Ireland. "Rock Bottom", op.cit is a similar account of oddities surrounding the Gibraltar shooting.

42. Kitson, F. "Bunch of Five", Faber & Faber, London, 1977, pp. 289-290.

43. Coogan, T.P. op.cit., 1987 edition p.293, pp.204-5 describes allegations of "framing" carried out by Eire Government to cause splits in the IRA.

44. Beresford, P.C.F.M. op.cit, pp. 599-609 and 661-685 (UDA and UVF). Coogan T.P., "The IRA", Fontana, London 1987, pp. 55-61 (UDA).

45. Sunday Times (London), December 1st 1985, p. 24e.

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