The lexicon of the Stasi

Volume 3 No 1 - 1999

The lexicon of the Stasi:
Language in the Service of the State

D. Lewis
University of Exeter

In 1992 the post-unification German authorities began a systematic investigation into the archives of the former East German Security Service (the Stasi). They soon made an intriguing discovery: a file of over 500 loose-leaved pages, labelled 'secret' and entitled 'Dictionary of Political-Operative Work'. The file was a lexicon of terms and definitions approved personally by Erich Mielke, the GDR Minister for State Security from 1957 until the collapse of the regime in the autumn of 1989. Intended for internal use by officers and staff of the Stasi, the file was the second edition of a version which appeared in 1970 and which served as a textbook for students of the Stasi's own Law College (the Juristische Hochschule or JHS, founded in 1965 in Potsdam). The second edition was started in 1981 and completed in 1985. A third edition was in preparation for the 40-year anniversary of the GDR, but its completion was pre-empted by the events of 1989.

The lexicon was conceived at a time when the East German leadership was promoting the GDR as a model of socialism within the Soviet bloc. From 1967 Walter Ulbricht, General Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party (SED), began openly to stress the GDR's ideological independence from the Soviet Union. He argued that, through its successful application of the scientific principles of Marxism-Leninism, the SED had achieved an ideal form of communist society which other socialist states could emulate (Weber 1991:104). The official term for the'GDR model' was the 'developed socialist society' (entwickelte sozialistische Gesellschaft). Not by chance it occurs frequently in the lexicon (see, for instance,the entry positive Einstellung). In fact the lexicon was produced by the newly founded JHS precisely in order to demonstrate to its masters the professional and academic achievements of the School at a time when the GDR model of socialism was being officially propagated. Students of the School were directly involved in its creation: entries were compiled by groups or individuals; longer contributions merited the award of a diploma qualification. The background to the production of the lexicon explains the stiff, quasi-academic tone adopted in many of the entries. It also accounts for the sense of strict political conformity that prevails throughout the work. Stereotyped formulae abound and entries generally take the form of dogmatic statements rather than a discussion of issues.

Unlike other 'political dictionaries' of Marxism-Leninism which the EastGerman state published in order to promote socialist ideology and to regulate the use of political language by the population (examples are the Kleines Wörterbuch der marxistisch-leninistischen Philosophie and the Wörterbuch zum sozialistischen Staat), the 'Dictionary of Political-Operative Work' was a compendium for specialists. It was never intended for public consumption: only 400 copies were produced and their distribution was carefully recorded. The Federal Government office set up after unification to preserve and manage the Stasi's archives finally published the lexicon in 1996 (Suckut 1996). The aim of publication was to provide a source for historical researchers and a tool that would help individuals understand the archive's contents. The need for such understanding arose partly out of the unique role that the Stasi had played in underpinning the regime of the old GDR and partly out of an unusual legacy: the huge volume of personal dossiers that the Stasi had assembled on the citizens of East Germany. For alongside its apparatus of over 85,000 full-time staff (100,000 according to some sources; see Henke 1993:60 and Gill and Schröter 1993:35) the Stasi maintained an estimated 180,000 amateur informants or IMs (informelle Mitarbeiter) for short. These were cajoled, bribed or blackmailed into reporting regularly on the activities and political attitudes of colleagues, fellow students, friends, and even close relatives. The full extent of this network and the scale of the 'information' that was amassed over the years did not emerge until after the SED relinquished power. Manfred Sauer, acting on behalf of Hans Modrow's transitional government, divulged the first genuine figures on the size of the Stasi to members of the Round Table on 15 January 1990. Before that, official western sources estimated the Stasi to have about 20,000 permanent staff and between 60,000 and 80,000 informants (this was the figure entered in the 1985 edition of the official handbook of the GDR produced by the Federal Ministry for Intra-German Relations; see DDR Handbuch 1985:909).

Once the Stasi had been disbanded, it was the archive and the sensitivity of its contents that raised the most serious issues for the German people. How reliable, for instance, was the information in the dossiers, in particular when it could be used to destroy the reputations of eastern German politicians striving to establish their credentials as born-again democrats? Did complicity with the Stasi merit immediate condemnation and withdrawal from public life in post-unification Germany, or was it wiser to accept that working for the authorities was just one of many compromises that individuals had to make in order to survive in a totalitarian system? And, of course, an individual had to reckon with the personal consequences of reading his own file: he could, for instance,discover that a trusted friend or a family member had been informing the Stasi for years about his every move, opinion and conversation.

After reviewing the history, development and organisation of the Stasi this paper focuses on the insights which the 'Dictionary of Political-Operative Work' throws on the workings and the mentality of the East German communist system. In particular it demonstrates how the internal language of the organisation reflects the extent to which the regime as a whole had distanced itself from its people and from the international situation - two features which, of course, contributed significantly to the downfall of the GDR.

The Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit or Stasi for short) was establishedby a rather vague law passed in the People's Chamber of the GDR on 8 February 1950. The role and functions of the Ministry were never properly defined in GDR law. Its activities were regulated by secret internal directives emanating primarily from whichever SED Minister it answered to (there were about 600 such directives by 1989). As the 'shield and sword of the Party', the Stasi became the personal instrument of the SED to whose leadership it was alone accountable (for an account of the Stasi's relationship to the SED see Fricke 1991:11ff). During the early years of the GDR the SED's leaders probably saw the Stasi's role as confined to countering the (albeit exaggerated) activities of western agents and heading off a resurgence of Nazism (Henke 1993:59). Eventual post-war economic prosperity - it was assumed - would demonstrate the superiority of the centrally planned economy and gain the loyalty of the working-class population, including those who remained stubbornly sceptical of communism. In keeping with this short-term, limited role, the Stasi in 1952 had little over 4,000 staff. Nevertheless the organisation became notorious for a series of spectacular kidnappings, especially of prominent 'traitors' - members of the SED, the GDR armed forces and officers of the Stasi itself - who had fled to the west. As soon as they had been returned to the east these unfortunates faced imprisonment and execution. There were several hundred such incidents and they continued into the early 1960s. The readiness to use openly violent tactics faded after the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.The Wall halted the haemorrhage of East Germans to the west and allowed the SED to stabilise the economy. From 1970 onwards the GDR improved its relationship with West Germany and in 1973 joined the United Nations, marking international recognition as a state. The improved political climate and the concern with stable inter-government relations based on mutual recognition and peaceful co-existence is reflected in the lexicon. Several entries stress the need to abide by international agreements. The use of violence and terror tactics to further the aims of socialism is explicitly rejected. Indeed, extreme left-wing groups and splinter organisations may resort to terroristic methods 'through lack of comprehension of the complexities of class conflict' (aus Unverständnis über die Kompliziertheit der Klassenauseinandersetzung; see the entry on Terror). Violent methods - it is claimed - are characteristics of capitalist countries, extreme right-wing groups or misguided freedom fighters (but note that this did not stop the GDR sheltering left-wing terror groups from the 1970s).

The Workers' Uprising of 1953 not only revealed the gulf between the people and its rulers, deeply shaking the GDR's leadership. It also exposed the Stasi's manifest failure to warn the leadership of the scale of popular discontent at a time when Walter Ulbricht was proclaiming the era of 'socialist construction' (at the 2ndParty Conference in 1952). As a result the organisation was reconstituted and, from the late 1950s, began to develop the vast apparatus that eventually monitored factories and industries, schools, colleges and universities, churches,dissident groups, east-west contacts, artistic circles - indeed as much of the population as possible by whatever means possible (informants, telephone tapping, opening post, electronic surveillance, etc). Before Mielke took over in 1957 the Ministers responsible for the Stasi were Wilhelm Zaisser (1950-53) and Ernst Wollweber (1953-57). Both were driven from their positions through internal party purges and it was under Mielke that the organisation began its long period of sustained expansion. By 1974 its complement of full-time staff stood at 55,700. In 1983 the figure reached 85,000, at which point a national labour shortage and economic difficulties prompted Mielke to issue a directive halting further enlargement (Gill and Schröter 1993:34-35).

The Stasi had (and used) its own powers of arrest and detention and frequently predetermined the outcome of any trial or judicial process. The organisation was especially severe on members of its own ranks who took up contacts with the west (one such Captain Werner Teske was executed as late as 1981). The Stasi conducted industrial and political espionage in the west, especially the Federal Republic. It sheltered and supported terrorist organisations such as the Baader-Meinhof Group/Red Army Faction, which murdered 25 members of the West German political and business establishment between 1971 and 1989 (Der Spiegel: Jahreschronik 98:98-99; Fricke 1991:57ff). It also maintained companies and front organisations in West Germany in order to generate hard currency for the beleaguered GDR economy. Although the Stasi's privileged position in GDR society was a matter of general knowledge, its true size and generous budget remained a state secret until 1990. Eventually devouring four hundred million marks a year, the organisation maintained over 1,800 buildings, including sports and recreational facilities and holiday homes, over 18,000 apartments, and a fleet of nearly 19,000 vehicles; the headquarters in Berlin-Lichtenberg stretched over several square kilometers and comprised about 24 separate administrative blocks and 3,000 rooms and offices. The Stasi's arsenal of weapons could have equipped a small army, and it disposed over a 11,000-strong regiment of elite soldiers based southeast of Berlin. The regiment, the Feliks Dzierzynksi, guarded key installations and SED leaders and was on constant alert to suppress internal uprising; it employed brutal tactics against anti-regime demonstrators on 7 and 8 October 1989 and was disbanded in February 1990(Fricke 1991:37f).

The internal organisation of the Stasi reflected its size and range of activities. In a hierarchical system of centralised line management, Erich Mielke maintained personal control over all aspects of the organisation. Day-to-day operational management, however, lay in the hands of his four 'representatives' - all Stasi officers with the rank of general(Generaloberst or Generalleutnant). Mielke took a particular interest in the affairs of Department (Hauptabteilung) II, which monitored foreign diplomatic services and journalists. The Department paid especially close attention to the Office of the West Germany's Permanent Representative in East Berlin.

The Stasi was divided into over 29 separate departments, each with its own specialist function. These functions included: to conduct espionage abroad; to combat infiltration in the army; to counter foreign espionage in the GDR; to monitor the radio, telephone and post (especially links with the west); to control foreign travel and tourism; and to combat terrorism and economic sabotage. The job of Department XX was to monitor the population of the GDR. For this it used informants to report on state institutions, the judiciary, the health service, education, youth work, the media, and the churches. The Department's main targets were opposition groups which were undermined in every conceivable way; methods ranged from passive surveillance to active infiltration. A similar departmental structure was replicated in each of the GDR's 15 regions (Bezirke). As an aside it may be noted that the intelligentsia were well represented in the Stasi. Half its permanent staff were educated to university or college level, which was a higher proportion than any other institution or industrial concern in the GDR, including the national Academy of Sciences. It is likely that many of the Stasi's informants were also highly educated, although this cannot be proved (Henke 1993:61).

Given the extent of the Stasi's information-gathering network, the question arises as to how reliable the information collected was and whether it was put to good use. Was the Stasi, for instance, able to overcome the failings of 1953 and provide the leadership with the information it needed to forestall the events of 1989? A partial answer to this question lies in Mielke's recorded statements and the internal briefings he gave after 1985, when perestroika in the Soviet Union placed the regime under increasing pressure to reform. These statements show that he viewed each and every hint of internal criticism in the GDR as fundamentally 'anti-socialist and contra-revolutionary' and as emanating from the imperialist enemy in the west (Gill and Schröter 1993:60). Mielke's responses reflected a vocabulary of militant socialism that would not have been out of place during an anti-fascist street demonstration in 1930s Berlin or even at the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and early 1960s. But not for one moment did they address the issues raised by the existence of an internal opposition movement in the GDR of the late 1980s. The list of such issues is long: they included the implications of the changing relationship between the Soviet Union and NATO, the status of political and human rights in East Germany, the pressure from citizens to leave the country and travel without being criminalised, the effects of industrial pollution on the natural and human environment, and the need to raise standards of living by developing a consumer-oriented economy. Mielke's obsession with the external enemy (Feind) reveals above all how he failed to acknowledge the possibility of genuine opposition from within the GDR. Within his limited horizons opposition groups must have originated outside the GDR and could only be sustained through external western support. Given such a perspective it is clear that the factual quality of the information painstakingly assembled by the Stasi was largely irrelevant, for it would never be analysed or interpreted in a useful way. The result was a vicious circle: evidence of internal opposition confirmed the need to take further measures in order to counteract the presumed enemy from outside, provoking even greater internal opposition, and so on.

At this point we may ask at what point the (mis-)interpretation of information provided by the Stasi started. For it was not necessarily the case that Stasi case officers gathered pure 'facts' which more senior individuals such as Mielke proceeded to distort. Much depends on the manner in which Stasi members elicited and recorded their information in the first place. This is where the secret lexicon of approved terms provides some interesting pointers (the more so since the author of this article has no legitimate access to dossiers compiled by the Stasi and is unable to judge the information at first-hand). As we shall see, the lexicon of terms confirms that members of the Stasi were expected to show the utmost commitment to socialist ideology. In a sense the volume is not so much a practical handbook as a manual of political correctness. Indeed it would never have been the official intention to use the lexicon in order to provide individual members with a comprehensive, factual knowledge of the activities of the service as a whole. Thus the lexicon does not describe the history or development of the Stasi, nor does it list many of its departments or clearly outline its management structures. Notably there is no factually informative entry on the Stasi itself. A contribution on the 'internal security of the Ministry for State Security' merely stresses the need for all Stasi staff and their families to commit themselves to implementing the decisions of the SED and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to remain vigilant and maintain their ideological integrity in the face of the anti-socialist enemy. Other surprising omissions for the manual include references to the camps planned to house dissidents in the event of a national emergency and entries on sister agencies of other socialist countries (Suckut 1996:27)

As mentioned earlier, the second edition of the lexicon took four years to produce. The precise reason for the delay is not known, but it is probably related to the security service's need to react to a changing international situation, in particular the effects of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik in the early 1970s and the increase in intra-German traffic following the Basic Treaty of 1972. East-west détente and the prospect of opening up the GDR to western influence posed serious challenges to the regime. The nature of the regime's response to these challenges emerges in additions to the second edition. For instance, an entire entry (gegnerische Kontaktpolitik), is now devoted to the dangers posed by western powers' alleged misuse of improved access to the GDR. Many terms relating to cross-border traffic and its control are added (15 entries for Verkehr and 17 forGrenze). In general there is an increase in entries relating to national security (Sicherheit, Sicherung). Moreover, while the lexicon includes no detailed information about the internal administrative organisation of the Stasi, an exception is made for those departments responsible for monitoring intra-German transit traffic. This most likely reflects the need for Stasi staff to be familiar with the complexities and the internal allocations of administrative responsibility in this area. After all, contacts between East and West Germany not only brought tangible economic benefits to the GDR, they also increased its exposure to potentially subversive western influences (see the sub-entry on politisch-operative Sicherung der Transitwege under grenzüberschreitender Verkehr).

Improvements in international relations are reflected in other ways, too. Separate entries on western institutions of the Cold War are dropped (e.g. BND (the West German Intelligence Service), British Intelligence Staff, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), Sûreté Nationale), as are historical references to the Third Reich (Gestapo, Reichshauptsicherheitsamt (RHSA)). On the other hand a new entry on Zionistic organisations describes in some detail the global structure of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO); the WZO is seen as a tool of the Israeli secret service and as 'reactionary, nationalistic, racist, counter-revolutionary, anti-social and anti-Soviet'. This particularentry reflects the GDR's criticism of Israeli policy in the Middle East, its own support for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, and its cultivation of relations with Arab states. What such entries clearly demonstrate is that, within the ideological parameters of state policy, the Stasi was expected to respond promptly to changes in international politics, or what it in the best bureaucratese called the 'political-operative situation' (politisch-operative Lage).

Many new entries for the second edition suggest that monitoring the population of the GDR in the face of increased western influence became a major priority for the Stasi and consumed considerable resources. Quite remarkable is the addition of over 50 new entries describing the recruitment,categorisation, role, training and handling of informants or IMs (see above). Other entries deal with internal issues such as the 'misuse of churches', 'dissident', and 'youth'. For 'youth', for instance, the second edition includes six new entries, covering topics such as youth movements and groups, their exploitation by the 'enemy', and the need to counter 'rowdyism', 'decadence' and 'criminality' in young people.

The incorporation of the GDR into a network of international treaties and organisations in the wake of Ostpolitik drew especially unwelcome attention to the regime's record on human rights. Official sensitivity to this issue is reflected in an entry entitled 'imperialist human rights demagogy' (imperialistische Menschenrechtsdemagogie). The tone is highly defensive and all human rights concerns are summarily dismissed as enemy propaganda (see also the entry on 'manipulationby the enemy' (feindliche Manipulierung)). As foreign journalists gained access to the GDR, the state also became concerned about the potentially damaging effects that uncensored and critical reports on conditions within the country could have on internal stability. Foreign correspondents became an extension of the wider external threat (see in particular the entry Korrespondenten ausländischer Publikationsorgane).

Many entries throw light on the methods, operations, technical practices and attitudes of the Stasi as an organisation. Topics covered range from encryption and surveillance techniques to the classification, recruitment and management of informants. Entries concerned with procedural matters suggest a meticulous, bureaucratic approach in the best German tradition. Thus the lexicon contains guidelines on how to conduct and document an arrest or how to search premises. Without the slightest hint of humour or self-irony one entry describes the procedure for preserving in bottles smells that can be later used to identify suspects (Geruchsdifferenzierung). Many of the terms in the lexicon relate to the internal language or jargon of espionage and secret service work. Examples are Tipper, Spielmaterial, Schwerpunktarbeit, Scheinobjekte,Schleuser/Schleusung, operative Schriftfahndung, Selbstanbieter, Selbstseller, Treff) and many more. Some terms are taken from western agencies (Ranger, Tipper, V-Mann-Führer, toter Briefkasten). Terms may refer to techniques or methods of espionage (lebender/toter Briefkasten), procedures to follow when conducting an operation, or they may classify individuals in ways that indicate their usefulness for or role within the security service. Persons may be categorised impersonally using abstract nouns. Thus Stützpunkt, normally a base or centre offering military support, denotes individuals or groups of GDR citizens who knowingly or unknowingly offer assistance to foreign agents and anti-communist organisations (see the various entries for types of Stützpunkte in the lexicon).

A particularly interesting category of entries deals with human attitudes and psychology. Under 'attitude' (Einstellung), for instance, there are descriptions and classifications of attitudes to socialism (seen as either negative or positive), to the Stasi itself, and to how attitudes may be nurtured among informants and other categories of operatives. An entry on 'imagination' (Phantasie) highlights the need for the Stasi officer to combine mental creativity and vision with a solid grasp of reality. A detailed analysis of such entries would undoubtedly reveal more about the internal ethos of the Stasi and the precise methods it adopted in monitoring the population.

An unmistakable feature of the lexicon is the use of stock terms and phrases as ideological leitmotifs. Perhaps the most important of these is the motif of the western 'enemy' (Feind). Attributes consistently associated with the enemy are: imperialist, hostile, negative forces (feindlich-negativ Kräfte), reactionary, subversive, aggresive, expansionist, terroristic, and counter-revolutionary. While western security services use 'informers' (Spitzel - a derogatory term equivalent perhaps to English 'nark' or 'grass'), the GDR on the other hand employs informelle Mitarbeiter, which is literally translated as 'informal co-workers' or 'colleagues'. Entries on 'imperialist secret services' (Geheimdienste, imperialistische) accuse these of 'ignoring human dignity' (Mißachtung der Würde des Menschen) and of being in the service of a 'monopolistic bourgeoisie'. Western agencies are portrayed as being beyond the democratic control of the state and of using all possible means to undermine 'progressive' (used as a synonym for socialist) societies, international treaties and world peace. The prime objective of the west and its agencies is the 'political and ideological subversion' (politisch-ideologische Zersetzung) of 'real socialism' and its achievements (der reale Sozialismus). Subversion and espionage are by definition practised only by capitalist states seeking to undermine their opponents by illegal means. Similar practices by socialist states are legitimised by the euphemistic, bureaucratic formula of 'political-operative' work (more on this below). There is no attempt to portray western societies in any objective or balanced way. In common with the standard Marxist-Leninist view the west is in permanent crisis and steady decline; this is in stark contrast to the 'growing economic, political, military and ideological strength of socialist states'. The class enemy is heavily depersonalised, with states and organisations presented in non-specific but highly evaluative terms. Thus despite the specialist target audience of the lexicon, foreign security agencies, where named, are not described in factual detail. The ideological-evaluative approach applies to references to NATO (see the entry on Spionage), West German border control agencies (Grenzüberwachungsorgane der BRD), emigré organisations (feindliche Emigrantenorganisationen), the various 'eastern bureaux' maintained by parties, universities and other organisations in the Federal Republic (Ostforschungsinstitute der BRD), and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (geheimdienstliche Personalienüberprüfung).

Notably 'hate' (Haß) has an entry all of its own. Hatred for the class enemy (Klassenhaß, der gehaßte Gegner) is portrayed as a good thing and as an essential component of 'Chekist feelings' (tschekistische Gefühle). The Cheka was the Bolshevik secret police founded in 1917 by Felix Dzerzhinsky, a Polish born aristocrat who dedicated himself to the communist cause Famous for its savage methods and its contempt for rules of judicial trial and evidence, it persecuted entire social classes between 1918 and 1921 as Lenin struggled to asserted the mastery of the Bolshevik party. The Cheka was superseded in turn by the OGPU, the NKVD (from 1935) and the KGB (from 1953). The lexicon describes hatred as 'one of the fundamental features of the passionate and irreconcilable struggle against the enemy'. Hatred is to be consciously 'deepened' and 'strengthened', especially among members of the secret service engaged in difficult operations. Although the lexicon defines the 'Chekist view of the enemy' (tschekistisches Feindbild) as 'concrete knowledge of the enemy', it is clear that subjective attitudes are supposed to form part of this 'knowledge'. Indeed one of the most potent weapons in the struggle between systems is a committed socialist who, in keeping with the spirit of the 'Chekist personality', nurtures 'deep feelings of hatred, revulsion, loathing and pitilessness' towards the 'enemy' (tiefe Geühle des Hasses, des Abscheus, der Abneigung und Unerbittlichkeit gegenüber dem Feind). Naturally it is assumed that the enemy returns such feelings in kind: the true socialist is 'venerated by the people and hated by the enemy' (vom Volk verehrt und vom Feind gehaßt). The link between ideological motivation and operational success underlies much of the 'psychology' of the Stasi lexicon. Apart from the primitiveness of the appeal to what are usually held to be destructive emotions, what is intriguing is that the Stasi reverted to the Cheka at all for its role model. One reason lies in the potent and carefully cultivated mythology surrounding the early revolutionary phase in Soviet communism. Another is the SED's deliberate self-identification with the Leninist 'new-type' communist party that was prepared to use any measure to establish its version of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The fact that Erich Mielke was a veteran of old guard (pre-war) communism also undoubtedly contributed within the service to the veneration of the heroic Soviet tradition. However, there is one significant difference between the SED and the Stasi. Whereas the population at large allowed SED party propaganda to wash over its head, paying mere lip-service to its injunctions, it could not so easily discount the attentions of the Stasi. For the Stasi was in a position to enact the language of hatred though persecution, imprisonment without trial, and other illegal methods. In short: 'Stasi-language was the language of doers' (Suckut 1996:20).

True to its ideological origins the lexicon contains a range of fairly standard formulae from the repertoire of Marxism-Leninism. Examples are numerous compounds with 'class' (Arbeiterklasse, Klassenwesen, Klassenkampf, Klassenschlachten, Klassenauseinandersetzung, Klassengegner, Klassencharakter, Klasseninteressen) and 'state' (Staatsordnung, staatsfeindlich). Western and socialist systems are portrayed in a stereotypical Marxist-Leninist way as two wholly incompatible systems, the differences being emphasised through the repetitive use of stock phrases and labels. We have already noted the customary attributes for the west, the class 'enemy', which is described as 'reactionary', 'monopolistic', 'imperialist' and 'aggressive'. Through the selective use of noun compounds the west is associated with exploitation of the working classes (die werktätigen Massen) and the impersonal forces of industrial and military might (Ausbeuterordnung, Militär-Industrie-Komplex, Machtmechanismus). The term 'capitalist' does not appear as frequently as one might expect, except perhaps in the stock phrase das kapitalistische Ausland. Socialist countries, by contrast, are associated with progressive social, political and economic development (progressive Kräfte, kontinuierliche ökonomische Entwicklung in den sozialistischen Ländern, sozialistische Entwicklung). They are assigned positive epithets such as 'peace-loving' (friedensschaffend, friedenserhaltend), 'humanistic' and 'international'. Throughout the lexicon communist states are referred to by a standard label that emphasises their legitimacy as an international political community or 'order' (sozialistische Gesellschafts- und Staatsordnung, sozialistische Staatengemeinschaft). This, too, is in keeping with the notion of the GDR as a particularly advanced model of communism, fulfilling the precepts of 'scientific socialism'.

Established features of socialist propaganda in Germany were its militant tone and appeal to pathos. Both reflect the earliest origins of the communist party as an embattled brotherhood of conspirators. Even after the Second World War official communist rhetoric continued to use the combative, militaristic language of the Third Reich. While not over-represented in the lexicon, features of pathos appear in references to friendship with the Soviet Union and with other socialist 'brother states' (Bruderländer). There are occasional appeals to patriotism (das sozialistische Vaterland), which strike a rather dated note but are in keeping with the GDR's claim to represent continuity in German history. Socialist pathos also underlies descriptions of the Stasi and its staff as 'belonging to' and 'committed to' to the working class, with whom it enjoys an 'emotional bond' (gefühlsmäßige Verbundenheit). Stasi members were expected to display exceptional loyalty (see the entry on Treue), which was manifested in trustworthiness, dedication, readiness for action, self-sacrifice, courage, and discipline. As soldiers (membership of the Stasi was equivalent to military service) they were enjoined to exhibit 'unconditional fighting spirit' and 'fortitude' (bedingungsloses Kämpfertum und Standhaftigkeit). The uncompromising and assertive tone of much of the language is mirrored by the use of grammatical and semantic superlatives; these are particularly evident in adjectives and adverbial phrases (examples are: von größter Wichtigkeit, untrennbarer Bestandteil, insbesondere, umfassend, allseitig, zielstrebig, grundlegend, verstärkt, bewußt, ständig, bedeutsame Aufgaben).

Finally, it is clear that the declamatory force behind the vocabulary and phraseology of the lexicon masks deep-seated mechanisms of self-contradiction and self-deception within the Stasi as an apparatus of the communist state (Suckut 1996: 23). Such mechanisms are, of course, symptoms of the wider contradiction between ideology and reality that existed in East German society as a whole under 'real existing socialism' (real existierender Sozialismus). We do not have to look far beneath the surface of the language of the lexicon to see evidence of the same contradiction. For instance, we may only infer the extent of the Stasi's surveillance activities from its highly detailed classification of types of informant (IM) and from the various procedures for handling them. At no stage is the obvious explicitly acknowledged: that the state is spying and reporting on its own citizens on a scale that no regime claiming to represent the legitimate interests of the people could seriously justify.

Another example is the dismissal of 'anti-socialist' western agencies' use of blackmail and bribery as 'corruption' (Korruption), when identical methods were also clearly employed by the Stasi. Of all the examples of the manipulation of language in order to distort reality, perhaps the most intriguing of all is the awkward-sounding term 'political-operative (politisch-operativ). Possibly the most ubiquitous phrase in the lexicon, it occurs in a variety of different collocations. These most commonly refer to work, processes, tasks, activities, measures, objectives, and personnel (Kräfte). There are also one-off references to political-operative language (Sprachgebrauch), offences (Straftaten), instructions (Anleitung), and the safeguarding of youth (Sicherung der Jugend). The wide spectrum of collocations suggests that the term has only limited denotational meaning but refers in a rather general sense to any aspect of Stasi activity. What is does do, however, is to convey the primacy of political ideology (politisch) and to suggest that conspiratorial methods play a key role in enforcing this ideology in all aspects of life (operativ). The term encapsulates key features of the Stasi: its bureaucratic structures and procedures, its conspiratorial world view, and its remoteness from the language of genuine human communication. In a sense it seems to be the natural product of the large-scale experiment in social engineering that the communist party undertook in the GDR.

References

Fricke, Karl-Wilhelm (1991) MfS intern. Macht, Strukturen, Auflösung der

DDR-Staatssicherheit. Analyse und Dokumentation, Cologne: Verlag und

Wissenschaft

Gill, David and Schröter, Ulrich (1993) Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. Anatomie des Mielke-Imperiums, Hamburg and Berlin: Rolwohlt

Henke, Klaus-Dietmar (1993) Wann bricht schon mal ein Staat zusammen! Die

Debatte über die Stasi-Akten auf dem 39. Historikertag 1992, Munich: DTV

Suckut, Siegfried (1996) Das Wörterbuch der Staatssicherheit, 2nd edition,

Berlin: Links Verlag

Weber, Hermann (1991) DDR. Grundriß einer Geschichte 1945-1990, Hannover:

Fackelträger Verlag

DDR Handbuch (1985) Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen,

Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik

Derek Lewis, January 1999

Copyright © 1999 Intellect Ltd, EFAE, Earl Richards Road North, Exeter, England, EX2 6AS